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Over the last decade, the United States military has struggled to develop 
methodologies to assess success in its execution of counterinsurgency 
operations.  By examining Zabul province, Afghanistan, this study offers a 
quantitative method to measure the effectiveness of positive communications 
that counterinsurgents conduct as part of their information strategy to mobilize 
public support for the incumbent government.  We test the hypothesis that 
positive communications play a significant role in shaping popular attitudes and, 
when conducted by counterinsurgents, influence the population to support the 
government and deny safe haven for insurgents.   
Estimating a variety of regression models, we utilize high-resolution 
spatio-temporal data to isolate the casual effect of population engagements and 
radio broadcasts in relation to levels of insurgent violence over time and space. 
The evidence supports our prediction that positive communications conducted by 
counterinsurgents reduce insurgent violence.  
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Do positive communications by the state reduce rebel violence during an 
insurgency?  More specifically, what role do positive communications have in 
gaining the support of the indigenous population for the government?  What role 
do they have in preventing the local populace from supporting insurgent actors?  
Underlying these questions is a complex problem set that military commanders 
have faced in assessing victory in every counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign.  
Measuring progress in a COIN environment is perhaps the most difficult task to 
accomplish in wartime.1  Data limitations are partly to blame.  It is impossible to 
measure the cognitive thoughts of the population without directly asking each 
person.  Even if direct questioning was possible, analysts must consider the 
impossibility of receiving an honest answer from every person.  Direct 
questioning would prove challenging in a permissive environment and is 
incredibly dangerous to friendly or neutral personnel in a hostile environment.  As 
a result, conclusive data on popular perceptions is extremely difficult to collect.  
Throughout the conflict in Afghanistan, military commanders have struggled to 
find a way to interview representative samples of the population to gain an 
understanding of the popular perception of both the Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and the Taliban. 
Not surprisingly, the current body of research on battlefield outcomes 
lacks systematic studies that analyze the effectiveness of information strategies 
in conflicted areas such as Afghanistan.  This study attempts to address that gap.  
Though we cannot directly measure popular perception through direct interviews 
in a contested environment, we can observe the impact of counterinsurgent 
positive communications to both mobilize public support for the incumbent 
government and to draw support away from the insurgency.  This study explores 
                                            
1 Department of the Army and United States Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 
Counterinsurgency, Field Manual 3-24 [electronic resource] (Washington, DC: Headquarters, 
Dept. of the Army, 2006), x, accessed August 31, 2013, 
http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps79762/FM_3-24.pdf. 
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quantitative methods for measuring the effectiveness of positive communications 
that counterinsurgents conduct as part of their information strategy in an attempt 
to mobilize public support toward the incumbent government.  By observing the 
effect of positive communications on insurgent violence, we systematically 
evaluate the success of counterinsurgents as they battle for control of the 
villages, cities, districts, and provinces of Afghanistan.  Using a variety of 
regression models and high-resolution geographic information system (GIS) data 
collected in Zabul province from 2009 to 2011, we examine the relationship 
between population engagements, radio messages, and levels of insurgent 
violence over time and space. 
This chapter lays out the contextual background information necessary to 
understand the role of positive communication in winning the loyalty of a state’s 
population.  First, we review the current theoretical framework used to model 
insurgencies and identify optimal strategic approaches required for both the state 
and the insurgents to succeed.  Second, we review conceptual models of how 
opposition organizations mobilize popular support and discuss how both hard 
power and soft power can either coerce or induce the compliance of the 
population.  Third, we briefly review the role of mass communications in today’s 
strategic landscape and examine why a state’s use of positive communications 
can be productive.  We then introduce a theory of positive communications and 
present the hypothesis that positive communications play a key role in reducing 
insurgent violence.  This chapter concludes by defining the research objective, 
research hypothesis, and research benefits. 
A. COUNTERINSURGENCY REVISITED 
1. The Process and Dynamics of Insurgency 
There is a widely held theory that insurgent warfare, unlike conventional 
warfare, is a struggle for “the hearts and minds” of the people, rather than a 
battle for territory against an opponent’s military forces.  This familiar assertion 
concludes that insurgencies (and counterinsurgencies) are political, not military 
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conflicts.2  While one can argue that all war is political, the nature of insurgent 
warfare is more political than most.  The ability to influence people, therefore, is 
vital to success in insurgent warfare.  Understanding both the process and 
dynamics of an insurgency is the first step in identifying optimal strategic 
approaches to defeat it as well as in choosing the correct assessment metrics.  
These processes and dynamics are best illustrated by Gordon McCormick’s 
“Mystic Diamond,” which outlines the interaction among the state and its internal 
non-ruling challenger(s), their relationship to the domestic population, and the 
position of international actors (see Figure 1).3  
 
Figure 1.  McCormick’s mystic diamond4 
McCormick argues that at the outset of an insurgency, the state enjoys a 
force advantage over the insurgents but suffers from an information 
                                            
2 Department of the Army and United States Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 
Counterinsurgency, 5–1. 
3 Gordon H. McCormick, “Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA, 18 July 2012). 
4 McCormick, “Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare,” 18 July 2012. 
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disadvantage.5  Even though the state has an advantage of force, it lacks the 
ability to “see” what it wishes to attack.  This information disadvantage stems 
from the fact that insurgent groups are inherently small, dispersed, and 
embedded within the populace, while the state force is often large, centralized, 
and isolated from the population.  These characteristics offer the insurgent 
anonymity with unimpeded freedom of movement, providing them with the ability 
to accept or refuse battle on their own terms.  Moreover, this anonymity prevents 
effective targeting by the security force, neutralizing the counterinsurgent's 
overwhelming size advantage.6  
Conversely, an insurgency begins small in material terms while 
possessing a marked information advantage over the counterinsurgent forces.7  
This information advantage stems from the insurgent’s ability to “see” the state’s 
security posture with unimpeded freedom of movement amongst the population.  
Yet the insurgent often lacks the material resources, funding, and manpower 
needed to challenge a state’s military capability.  In sum, because of both sides 
respective disadvantages in intelligence and resources (people, guns, money), 
they are evenly matched against each other.  Neither the state nor the insurgent 
can decisively eliminate the other from the contest.  All things being equal, the 
conflict usually extends indefinitely until either a negotiated settlement is reached 
or a stalemate is broken.8  Logically, whichever side first overcomes his 
disadvantage can substantially erode or diminish his opponent’s chances of 
victory.9 
                                            
5 Points in this section are drawn from discussion in Professor Gordon McCormick’s Seminar 
in Guerrilla Warfare, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, summer 2012. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Gordon H. McCormick and Frank Giordano, "Things Come Together: Symbolic Violence 
and Guerrilla Mobilisation," Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 (2007): 295. 
9 Points in this section are drawn from discussion in Professor Gordon McCormick’s Seminar 
in Guerrilla Warfare, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, summer 2012. 
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McCormick concludes that both players can only rectify their 
disadvantages by following one of the five strategies outlined in his model.10  As 
illustrated in his “Mystic Diamond,” these strategies are: (1) building a bridge to 
the population, (2) disrupting the opponent’s capability to influence the 
population, (3) attacking the opponent directly, (4) disrupting the opponent’s 
relation to the international community, and (5) building a bridge to the 
international community.  Viewed from this perspective, the loyalty of the state’s 
population is a decisive factor in the conflict.11  If an insurgency is a politico-
military struggle to overthrow the incumbent government, to establish a new 
government, to change an existing policy, or to expel an occupying force, then 
mobilizing the loyalty of the state’s population is essential for the insurgency to 
achieve its political objective.12  The theory of victory for the state is essentially 
the same if it wishes to remain in power. 
2. Mobilizing Public Support: “Hard Power” Versus “Soft Power” 
Logic dictates that an insurgency requires public support to get started 
and gain momentum, and that the state requires the same to counter the 
insurgent threat.13  This implies that both the insurgent’s and the state’s 
prospects are improved by gaining the support of at least some portion of the 
population, as the collective preference of the population towards either side of 
the conflict can be a decisive factor in determining the outcome of an 
insurgency.14  To gain this preference, both sides must employ a strategy that 
entices the population to support their cause while deterring the population from 
supporting the cause of the opposite side.  Joseph Nye identifies two strategies 
                                            
10 McCormick, “Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare,” 18 July 2012. 
11 Points in this section are drawn from discussion in Professor Gordon McCormick’s 
Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, summer 2012. 
12 John Arquilla, Heather Gregg, and Hy S. Rothstein, “Introduction,” in The Three Circles of 
War (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2010), 4. 
13 Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf Jr, Rebellion and Authority: An Analytical Essay on 
Insurgent Conflicts (Chicago, IL: Markham Publishing Company, 1970), 8. 
14 Points in this section are drawn from discussion in Professor Gordon McCormick’s 
Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, summer 2012. 
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that political actors can employ to influence popular support: hard power and soft 
power.15  Though the concepts of both hard power and soft power have 
generally been applied to elements of national power employed by states, 
against other states, these concepts also accurately reflect the strategies used 
both at the operational and tactical levels in a counterinsurgency. 
a. Hard Power: Logic of Consequences 
According to Nye, hard power is the ability to change the behavior 
of others by using either force (threats) or inducement (payments).16  This 
approach highlights the use of military and economic power as a means to 
mobilize public support.17  According to McCormick, when rational actors face 
alternatives, they select the choice they believe will offer them the highest 
expected return.18  People make choices based not only on their preferences, 
but also on their expectations about the immediate and future consequences of 
their actions.19  Because political power is the central issue in insurgencies, each 
side is likely to possess a group of “hard-core” supporters.20  The remaining 
population consists of three groups that reflect varying individual preferences: 
potential state supporters, potential insurgency supporters, and the undecided.21   
While it seems likely that hard-core supporters will remain 
unconditionally loyal to their respective organizations, we assume that the 
                                            
15 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York, NY: 
Public Affairs, 2004). 
16 Joseph S. Nye, “Soft Power, Hard Power and Leadership” (paper presented at Seminar for 
Leadership at Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, October 27, 2006), 23, accessed October 31, 
2013, 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/netgov/files/talks/docs/11_06_06_seminar_Nye_HP_SP_Leadership.
pdf.   
17 Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 4.  
18 Points in this section are drawn from discussion in Professor Gordon McCormick’s 
Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, summer 2012. 
19 McCormick and Giordano, "Things Come Together,” 298. 
20 Department of the Army and United States. Marine Corps Combat Development 
Command, Counterinsurgency, 1–1. 
21 McCormick and Giordano, “Things Come Together,” 301. 
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individual preferences of the remaining population will vary depending on two 
sets of conditions.22  The first condition considers the net assessment of an 
individual’s current costs and benefits that will be achieved by supporting either 
side.  The second condition reflects an individual’s perception of the probability of 
either side winning the conflict.23  Popular expectations concerning which side is 
likely to win, in this respect, will have a central effect upon individuals’ choices.24  
McCormick summarizes the expected value of the population’s support for either 
side in Table 1. 
 
State’s Expected Value 
( ) ( )s s s s ss i siEV b c p b p c= − + −  
Insurgency’s Expected Value 
s(b ) p ( )i i i i ii isEV b c p c= − + −  
s  represents the state i  represents the insurgency 
sb =  Present benefit of joining the 
state 
ib =  Present benefit of joining 
insurgency 
sc =  Present cost of joining the state ic =  Present cost of joining the 
insurgency 
sp =  Probability that the state will win ip =  Probability that the insurgency 
will win 
ssb =  Benefit of joining the state if the 
state wins 
iib =  Benefit of joining the 
insurgency if the insurgency wins 
ip =  Probability that the insurgency 
will win 
sp =  Probability that the state will 
win 
sic =  Cost of joining the state if the 
insurgency wins 
isc =  Cost of joining the insurgency if 
the state wins 
Table 1.   The opposition’s expected value25 
Comparing each side’s expected value, each member of the 
population should provide his support to the side that offers greater returns, given 
their preferences.  Thus, the side that successfully achieves higher expected 
values amongst more members of the population, should gain more support and 
                                            
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid.  
24 Ibid., 296. 
25 Ibid., 301. 
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thereby achieve victory.  In this respect, the state pursues a hard power 
approach because it has the inherent advantage of material resources over the 
insurgent, and can use such tools to reduce the expected benefits and increase 
the expected costs of siding with the insurgents.  Our literature review identified 
that most recent quantitative literature on civil conflict generally uses elements of 
hard power (for example, attrition rate, territory, or gross domestic product per 
capita) as metrics to assess state success against insurgents, in part because 
these hard power metrics are tangible, and easy to measure.26 
b. Soft Power: Logic of Appropriateness 
In contrast, soft power is the ability to shape the preferences of 
others by attraction.27  This approach highlights the use of intangible assets such 
as values, attractive personalities, or cultural power to mobilize public support.28  
The inherent qualities of legitimacy and authority draw the population to support 
the side that uses soft power more effectively.  If a side is viewed as legitimate 
because of the actions it takes and its ability to persuade an audience through 
effective communication, it will attract greater levels of support.  Moreover, 
institutions with high levels of political credibility and access to multiple means of 
communication are likely to possess advantages in the deployment of soft power.  
Non-state actors who do not possess the advantage of forces or 
resources are therefore likely to employ soft power to achieve their objectives.  
This implies that as the information revolution reduces the costs of obtaining and 
maintaining information, it may also decrease the power of states, providing an 
                                            
26 Eli Berman, Jacob N. Shapiro, and Joseph H. Felter, "Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? 
The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq," Journal of Political Economy 119, no. 4 (August 
2011): 766–819, accessed October 21, 2013, 
http://www.princeton.edu/~jns/publications/Hearts%20and%20Minds_Final.pdf; Luke N. Condra 
Joseph H. Felter, Radha K. Iyengar, and Jacob N. Shapiro, "The Effect of Civilian Casualties in 
Afghanistan and Iraq," National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 16152 (July 
2010), accessed October 31, 2013, http://www.nber.org/papers/w16152.pdf; Jason Lyall, "Does 
Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks? Evidence from Chechnya," Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 53, no. 3 (2009), 331–362. 
27 Nye, “Soft Power, Hard Power and Leadership,” 3. 
28 Ibid. 
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advantage to the insurgency that partially substitutes for its disadvantage in 
material resources.29  However, little is known about such relationships, as few 
quantitative studies of civil conflict have used elements of soft power as metrics 
to assess state success against insurgents, in part because these metrics are by 
their nature so difficult to measure directly. 
3. The Role of Mass Communications 
In a counterinsurgency, the state communicates with the population by 
various means to gain their trust and support.  To counter this, insurgents use the 
information environment to convey stories and narratives that seek to undermine 
the state’s ability to mobilize the population.  The ensuing battle of narratives 
centers on the need to win over critical elements of the population, such as 
influential political, military, social, and religious leaders who have either formal 
or informal power within the society, thereby gaining the compliance of the 
general population.  Moreover, both sides seek to influence not only the local 
population, but also the regional and global community.  They attempt to draw 
the sympathy of these regional and global networks to gain support, funding, and 
recruitment platforms.  Therefore, a skillful and coherent information strategy by 
the state to counter the insurgent narrative can prove the difference between 
victory and defeat.30 
The success of a state’s information strategy hinges not only on the 
quality of its political message, but also on its ability to disseminate its political 
message to the population.  Mass communication accessibility, in this context, 
plays a critical role in the state’s capacity to influence the behavior of 
individuals.31  As Deutsch argued, the production of voluntary compliance can be 
                                            
29 Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 63.  
30 John Arquilla and Douglas A. Borer, Information Strategy and Warfare: A Guide to Theory 
and Practice (New York: Routledge, 2007), 2. 
31 Camber Warren, "Not by the Sword Alone: Soft Power, Mass Media, and the Production of 
State Sovereignty," International Organization 68 (Winter 2014), 6, accessed October 31, 2013, 
http://www.camberwarren.net/papers.html. 
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greatly enhanced by technologies of mass communication.32  Warren elaborates 
further on this idea by identifying an empirical linkage between mass 
communications accessibility and the loyalty of a state’s population.33  Using 
cross-national data, he shows that states with high levels of mass communication 
accessibility are more likely to achieve high levels of voluntary compliance with 
state dictates, and thus lower levels of internal violence.34  In a similar manner, it 
seems reasonable to suppose that positive communications by counterinsurgent 
forces, such as population engagements and radio messages, could produce 
higher levels of public support, thereby reducing levels of violence against the 
state over time and space. 
We define positive communications as constructive, non-coercive, and 
non-lethal activities initiated by counterinsurgents to attract voluntary compliance 
from the population.  Positive communications seek to shape the population’s 
values, preferences, and behaviors through information campaigns, by 
combining simple actions—such as population engagements and radio 
broadcasts to inhibit the use of violence against state forces and the civilian 
population.  We suspect that such information campaigns, when combined with 
concrete actions, can move the population to support the state in greater 
numbers. 
Information campaigns, one of the staples of positive communications, 
seek to inform local audiences of the government’s vision for the future.  As 
Kalev Sepp reminds us:  
…information campaigns explain to the population what they can 
do to help their government make them secure from insurgents, 
encourage participation in the political process by voting in local 
and national elections, and convince insurgents they can best meet 
                                            
32 Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry Into the Foundations 
of Nationality (Cambridge: Technology Press of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and 
New York: Wiley, 1953), 10.  
33 Warren, "Not by the Sword Alone,” 6. 
34 Ibid., 10. 
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their personal interests and avoid the risk of imprisonment or death 
by reintegrating themselves into the population…35 
Radio, one medium essential to the delivery of messages in an 
information campaign, provides a channel to promote social norms and create an 
environment that is favorable and conducive to siding with the state.  In 
Afghanistan, counterinsurgent-sponsored radio stations mix local musical 
entertainment with conversational programs that relay the government’s positive 
actions to the population.  These messages play an important role in shaping 
public opinions and sentiments.  When followed up with actions, we suspect that 
radio messages can help the government gain a public support advantage over 
the insurgency. 
Population engagements provide another medium to influence the 
population.  Population engagements not only provide an opportunity for 
counterinsurgents to build trusted networks with critical communicators and 
power brokers within the population, they also allow a face-to-face venue for 
counterinsurgents to directly shape the perceptions of the population.  Population 
engagements are critical to influencing individuals, especially where radio 
broadcasts have already shaped popular attitudes in ways conducive to the 
state.  The combination of population engagements and radio messages 
provides the government with a powerful platform to gain the trust and 
confidence of the population.  When combined with actions, we suspect that 
using these mediums to conduct information campaigns can result in substantial 
gains for the government.  
Our thesis seeks to provide evidence for these claims, by comparing the 
effects of population engagements and radio messages in areas where the 
incumbent forces can exercise mechanisms of mass communications, to their 
effects in areas where the state lacks such abilities.  We argue that what counts 
                                            
35 Kalev Sepp, "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency," Military Review (May–June 2005): 5, 




as success in this regard can be represented by the ability of the state to prevent 
the population from using violence against the state or against each other.  A 
relative drop or lack of violence is therefore an ideal empirical indicator of 
variance in the success of counterinsurgent forces. 
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
Since 2009, the U.S. has embarked on a population-centric approach to 
assist GIRoA in combating Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan.  The focus of this 
approach centers on protecting the population, while balancing the use of both 
hard power and soft power.  The use of soft power, such as population 
engagements and radio messages, meets our definition of positive 
communications.  But has this strategy been successful? 
An examination of lessons learned by past counterinsurgency campaigns 
reveal a lack of systematic studies that analyze the impact and effectiveness of 
positive communications conducted by counterinsurgents.  This study seeks to 
systematically measure the effectiveness of positive communications by 
counterinsurgents in time and space.  To do this, we use high-resolution GIS 
data to isolate the casual effect of selected aspects of positive communications 
upon insurgent violence levels across Zabul province, Afghanistan in 2010 and 
2011. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Leveraging this combination of temporal and spatial datasets, we develop 
a regression model to answer the following question: To what degree do positive 
communications conducted by counterinsurgents reduce violence during an 
insurgency? 
D. WAY AHEAD 
The following chapters discuss the development and implementation of 
our positive communications assessment model.  Chapter II provides insight into 
some initial attempts by U.S. forces to measure the effectiveness of 
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counterinsurgency operations.  It reviews previous literature on the subject and 
reports some gaps and shortfalls that our research attempts to fill. 
The third chapter explains why we chose Zabul as the test bed for our 
research.  This chapter identifies each of our variables and their sources, and 
explains the methods we used to structure the data used in our regression 
model. 
The fourth chapter reports the results of our regression model and 
examines their implications for currently accepted counterinsurgency doctrines.  
Chapter V discusses our recommendations to optimize the effects of positive 
communications in COIN campaigns and identifies avenues for follow-on 
research.  
E. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
This research offers a new way to quantitatively analyze the effectiveness 
of counterinsurgency operations.  This model demonstrates which factors 
counterinsurgents should use to measure their effectiveness, and can provide 
instant feedback on their actions when measured over time.  Scalable to 
measure effectiveness at any scale from a village to a country, this model can 
potentially serve as a battlefield tool from the platoon to the corps level of 
command, giving commanders the ability to assess the effectiveness of their 








Assessing the effectiveness of counterinsurgency operations is difficult. 
Some attempts seek to measure effectiveness from a purely subjective 
perspective.36  Others try to measure effectiveness objectively, gathering either 
too many metrics or focusing their efforts on gathering the wrong ones.37  This 
project has its roots in one of these similar attempts—the love bank index of 
Combined Team Zabul.  This chapter discusses the love bank index, what was 
measured, and how we decided to improve upon this model using quantitative 
assessments of battlefield effectiveness.  In this chapter, we also explore existing 
publications that attempt to develop methodologies for COIN assessment.  We 
report the gaps and shortfalls that we discovered in the current body of literature 
regarding COIN assessments and describe how we intend to measure the impact 
of positive communications that counterinsurgents conduct as part of their 
information strategy.   
A. THE LOVE BANK INDEX 
While in Afghanistan in 2010–2011, one of the authors, serving with the 
U.S. Army’s 2nd Cavalry Regiment information operations cell, experimented 
with approaches to measuring the perception of the local population in Zabul 
province towards GIRoA and Taliban insurgents, both of whom competed to win 
their support.  These experiments in assessment methodologies resulted in a 
metric collection platform the unit referred to as the “love bank index” or LBI for 
short.38   
                                            
36 Ben Connable, Embracing the Fog of War: Assessment and Metrics in Counterinsurgency 
(Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2012). 
37 Gregory A Daddis, No Sure Victory: Measuring US Army Effectiveness and Progress in 
the Vietnam War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
38 Michael J. Sieber and Matthew Daigle, "Measuring Influence: The Love Bank of Combined 
Team Zabul, Afghanistan" (White Paper, 2010). 
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The LBI considered actions (positive and negative) taken by 
counterinsurgents and insurgents, and evaluated the effects of these actions on 
the aggregate population’s perception, by district.  The unit measured changes to 
each district’s LBI score in an attempt to measure popular perception over time.  
As a co-creator of the LBI model, one of the authors of this work took lessons 
learned from that model to develop a model that more accurately measures the 
effect of counterinsurgent actions.  Instead of seeking to measure popular 
perception directly, we seek to assess the impact of positive communications by 
measuring levels of communication activity, the reach of communication 
infrastructure, and the levels of violence that result from variation in these 
conditions over time and space. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A review of existing research identified several books, journal articles, and 
Department of Defense (DoD) publications that provide recommended 
techniques and procedures to assess COIN effectiveness.  These publications 
provide basic principles of assessments, but generally do not discuss the 
analytical methodologies needed to actually conduct the assessments.39  
Though most sources recommend a balance of quantitative and qualitative 
metrics, no source lays out a scientific method to combine these metrics in a 
coherent manner that accurately describes the situation on the battlefield. 
Many works point out methodologies that failed to measure success in 
COIN campaigns.  For instance, Daddis provides several explanations of the 
shortcomings of American assessment methodologies in Vietnam, while 
                                            
39 James Clancy and Chuck Crosset. "Measuring Effectiveness in Irregular Warfare," 
Parameters 37, no. 2 (2007): 91–98, accessed November 18, 2013, 
http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/07summer/clancy.pdf; Connable, 
Embracing the Fog of War, 59–169; Jason Campbell, Michael E. O'Hanlon, and Jeremy Shapiro, 
"How to Measure the War: Judging Success and Failure in Counterinsurgency," Policy Review 
no. 157 (October 2009): 4, accessed November 18, 2013, 
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/5490; David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 51; Department of the Army and United States 
Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Counterinsurgency, 5-26–5-29;United States, 
Counterinsurgency Operations, Joint Publication 3-24 [electronic resource] (Washington, DC: 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2009), x-15–x-19.  
 17 
Connable discusses the failures of assessments of U.S. forces in Afghanistan.40 
Nearly all of the sources that we explored recommend or assume that a 
centralized assessment collection method is a necessary function of the DoD and 
the U.S. government as a whole.  Connable’s work, however, points out that 
these centralized mechanisms are a major shortfall in COIN assessment 
systems.  Core metrics, according to Connable, fail to capture the localized 
context of insurgencies and are not applicable across all operating 
environments.41  He argues that because of inherent inconsistencies in such 
metrics, the military should conduct assessments in a more decentralized 
manner. 
From 2010 to 2011, for example, assessment methodologies conducted 
by International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) focused on qualitative 
assessments by commanders at the district and provincial levels.  These reports 
were fed into a centralized report provided to the Northern Atlantic Treaty 
Organization headquarters and U.S. policymakers by the Afghan assessment 
group at ISAF Joint Command.42   
According to Daddis, American forces in Vietnam experienced 
complications by collecting too many data points without evaluating how 
accurately such data reflected progress on the battlefield.43  Few within Military 
Assistance Command—Vietnam (MACV) analyzed the collected data, leaving 
senior officers with no way of accurately assessing their level of success in COIN 
operations.  Daddis further discusses how “systems analysis” became the tool of 
choice for Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and his staff.  Faulty 
application of the systems analysis methodologies encouraged the measurement 
of a large amount of variables instead of identifying few metrics that reflect 
                                            
40 Daddis, No Sure Victory, 330; Connable, Embracing the Fog of War, 153–200. 
41 Connable, Embracing the Fog of War, 171. 
42 Ibid., 158; Examples include battle space owner assessments in Regional Command 
(RC)-West, line of operations ratings in RC-East, and significant activities reports in RC-North. 
43 Daddis, No Sure Victory, 330.  
 18 
strategic objectives.44  Consequently, MACV, and much of DoD, went about 
measuring everything and, therefore, in effect, measured nothing.  In the process 
of data collection, the data became an end unto itself.45 
Both Connable and Daddis show extensive proof that counterinsurgents 
must nest assessments to strategic objectives.  According to Daddis, the U.S. 
Army in Vietnam often stumbled through the conflict without a consensus on its 
strategy.  Analysts never linked the actions of combat units to strategic objectives 
because metrics failed to connect the two.  Counterinsurgent decision makers 
and staffs must nest metrics with strategic objectives to accurately measure 
progress. 
C. LITERATURE SHORTFALLS 
Our literature review reveals significant gaps in COIN assessment 
methodologies. Only a few recent academic journals and working papers have 
used empirical data to examine variation in the effectiveness of COIN strategies.  
In 2010, Luke Condra and his colleagues found a positive relationship between 
civilian casualties and the levels of future violence in Iraq and Afghanistan.46  
Jason Lyall, on the other hand, found the opposite effect in Chechnya from 2000 
to 2005, using Russian artillery data to show a negative correlation between the 
amount of rounds fired and acts of violence in a geographic area.47  In 2011, Eli 
Berman and colleagues developed and tested an economic theory of insurgency, 
seeking to find a causal relationship between reconstruction spending and 
insurgent violence during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Their results support the 
theory that improved service provision reduced insurgent violence, particularly for 
smaller projects.48  Although these three studies provide useful and compelling 
                                            
44 John E. Gibson, John, Willian T. Schener, and Wiliam F. Gibson, How to Do System 
Analysis (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 2007). 
45 Daddis, No Sure Victory, 330. 
46 Condra et al., "The Effect of Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq," 7. 
47 Lyall, "Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks," 332.  
48 Berman, Shaperio, and Felter, “Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought,” 766–819. 
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insights, they generally treat aspects of hard power (for example, mortar shells 
and Commander’s Emergency Response Program or CERP funding) as their key 
independent variables when assessing state success or failure against 
insurgents. 
Most recently, using cross-national data on mass media accessibility, 
Camber Warren found strong evidence that communications (for example, soft 
power) play a central role in preventing the onset of civil conflict.49  Our model 
builds on this research, using high-resolution, spatio-temporal data to determine 
the effect of positive communications in the midst of a COIN campaign.   
 
                                            
49 Warren, "Not by the Sword Alone," 10. 
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III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This chapter outlines our analytic strategy.  To gain an understanding of 
the effect of positive communications in a zone of conflict, it is critical to 
understand the operational environment in which it is applied.  Effective analysis 
requires recognition of the mechanics that counterinsurgents use to deliver 
positive communications, in addition to an understanding of the many variables 
that can affect how positive communications are received by the targeted 
population.  The first section explores the province of Zabul in southern 
Afghanistan, including why we chose this province to conduct our research. The 
second discusses the methodology that we used.  The third describes all 
variables that we considered to potentially affect the reception of positive 
communications by the people of Zabul province. 
A. WHY ZABUL? 
Zabul province provides an ideal venue for analysts to assess the 
effectiveness of positive communications in a counterinsurgency environment.  
Throughout the conflict in Afghanistan, control of Zabul has fluctuated, with the 
population showing support for both the Taliban and GIRoA at different times.  
Representing a cross section of southern Afghanistan, Zabul has wide flat 
valleys, snow covered peaks, and rolling terrain—a microcosm of entire country.  
The people of this agrarian province have used the tribal Jirga system to govern 
themselves for generations.  Through self-government and limited external 
communication, the people of Zabul have generally remained focused on 
satisfying their immediate needs.  They have seen countless outsiders pass 
through their fields over the years and pay little attention to the problems of the 
outside world.  Because of its location, its demographics, and its ever-present 
state of contestation between GIRoA and the Taliban, we chose Zabul province 
to explore the effects of COIN positive communications. 
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1. Location and Terrain 
The location of Zabul in southern Afghanistan lends itself to conflict.  
Situated northeast of Kandahar, Zabul province also shares borders with the 
provinces of Uruzgan, Ghazni, Paktika, and the Baluchistan province of Pakistan.  
The province is well connected to the rest of Afghanistan because of major 
improvements on the Highway-1 ring road, which dissects the province through 
the central districts of Shahjoy, Qalat, and Tarnak wa Jaldak.  Given optimal road 
conditions, a motorist, driving from the provincial capital of Qalat, can reach 
Kandahar in just over two hours and can reach Kabul in approximately six hours.  
GIRoA, ISAF, and locals all use the ring road to transport troops, crops, and 
supplies.  Zabul’s proximity to Kandahar, Pakistan, and Kabul leads many 
transients to pass through the province on a regular basis. 
In Zabul, Highway-1 parallels the Tarnak river, which carves out a wide, 
flat valley through the middle of the province.  The Arghandab river valley 
parallels the Tarnak to its north, beginning in the higher elevations of the 
northeast Arghandab district and running through Mizan towards Kandahar city.  
The northern districts consist of severely restricted terrain towards the 
snowcapped peaks of the Hindu-Kush mountains, while the restricted terrain in 
the southern districts limits travelers to only a few mountain passes towards the 
central valley, which flattens into rolling hills in the southern bare lands of the 
province.  This mountainous terrain makes it difficult for counterinsurgents to 
extend their sphere of influence and control throughout Zabul. 
The Taliban uses Zabul’s terrain to facilitate the transportation of fighters 
in and out of Afghanistan, with direct lines of communication to the Quetta Shura 
Taliban (QST), headquartered in the city of Quetta, Pakistan.50  Utilizing the 
porous national border between Zabul’s Shamulzai district and Pakistan, Taliban 
insurgents make their way into Zabul and then transit the Arghandab river valley 
                                            
50 Jeffrey Dressler and Carl Forsberg, The Quetta Shura Taliban in Southern Afghanistan: 
Organization, Operations, and Shadow Governance [electronic source] (Washington, D.C: 
Institute for the Study of War, 2009), 5, accessed October 6, 2013, 
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/QuettaShuraTaliban_1.pdf. 
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and the Tarnak river valley, both of which provide natural concealment for 
fighters heading towards Kandahar.  To make this journey unimpeded, it is 
essential for the Taliban to have the support of Zabul’s population along these 
routes.  Figure 2 provides a visual representation of Zabul province, and its major 
roads. 
 
Figure 2.  Zabul province51 
2. Demographics and Communication in Zabul 
Zabul, situated in the heart of Afghanistan’s Pashtun belt, has an 
estimated population of over 400,000 scattered across sparse pockets of villages 
across the province.  The cities of Shah Joy and Qalat, both along Highway-1, 
have larger population counts, but are by no means urban centers.  Zabul’s 
sparse villages result in a limited dissemination of news and information across 
the province.  When an incident, such as a Taliban act of intimidation or a GIRoA 
                                            
51 “Afghanistan Shape Files, Roads—(Line)” (Islamabad, Pakistan: Afghanistan Information 
Management Services, 2005), accessed August 1, 2013, 
http://www.aims.org.af/ssroots.aspx?seckeyt=295. 
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act of governance, occurs in one village, news of that event propagates quickly 
by word of mouth through the surrounding villages, but it may take weeks or 
months for news of that event to reach clusters of villages elsewhere in the 
province.  Radio facilitates the spread of information across the province at a 
more rapid rate. 
The population listens to a variety of government and independent radio 
stations to get their news.  Print media is a non-factor, with an 11 percent literacy 
rate across the province.52  The sparse villages of Zabul and limited 
communications means across the province allow influencers to control the flow 
of information, using the limited information environment to their advantage. 
3. Zabul’s State of Contention 
The population of Zabul sits mostly on the fence when it comes to 
choosing acceptance of the Taliban or GIRoA (see Figure 3).  From 2010 
through 2011, GIRoA was firmly in control of Qalat district and the Taliban was 
firmly in control of Khaki-Afghan district.53  The other nine districts remained in 
various states of contestation, with the advantage ebbing and flowing between 
the Taliban and GIRoA over the course of the years.54  
                                            
52 Ann Marlowe, "The Back of Beyond: A Report from Zabul Province," World Affairs 
(March—April, 2010), accessed October 7, 2013, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/back-
beyond-report-zabul-province.  
53 Michael J. Sieber, “Field Notes: Zabul Province” (2011). 
54 Unfortunately, this status quo may have changed in the spring of 2013 with the April car 
bomb that targeted Provincial Governor Mohamed Naseri outside of the governance compound in 
Qalat. The attack killed six Americans, including U.S. diplomat Anne Smedinghoff. Governor 
Naseri was not injured in the blast; however, the fact that a large-scale attack was successfully 
executed on the doorsteps of the Provincial Government Center in Qalat possibly changed the 
dynamic of control as ISAF forces relinquish more responsibilities to ANSF and GIRoA. For more 
information on this attack. Ernesto Londoño and Anne Gearan. “Six Americans, Including Three 





Figure 3.  Control of Zabul by district55 
The Taliban and GIRoA continually compete for governance authority at 
the district and village levels throughout Zabul.  The Taliban enjoys more 
success in integrating with the tribal social structure and Jirga systems that have 
governed clusters of villages throughout southern Afghanistan for generations.  
One of the reasons for this success lies in their understanding of the tribal 
dynamics of each area, which allows them to appoint leaders from the same 
clans to represent their interests.  GIRoA, on the other hand, appoints sub-
national government leaders from a more nationalistic perspective.  Since its 
creation, GIRoA has attempted to influence its citizens to identify as Afghans, a 
concept that has not gained much traction over the years, especially in the 
southern Pashtun regions.  Pashtuns continue to identify themselves by family 
                                            
55 Sieber, “Field Notes: Zabul Province.” The author generated this visual presentation using 
field notes and ARCGIS software. 
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and tribal ties as opposed to identifying themselves as Afghans as a whole.56  
The Taliban can partially attribute their success to the population’s sympathy for 
their Pashtun roots and their lack of a national identity.  Through generations of 
conflict, the Pashtun tribes have developed distrust for outsiders, whether foreign 
militaries patrolling through villages, or Afghan government appointees from a 
distant tribal clan.  The Taliban identify with at least some of the population as 
home grown fighters battling to prevent the influence of the occupying ISAF upon 
the people of Afghanistan. 
GIRoA’s Independent Directorate for Local Governance, which works 
directly for President Karzai, appoints district governors throughout Afghanistan.  
In Zabul province, district governors often originate from different parts of the 
country or from different tribal affiliations, putting them at a disadvantage as they 
attempt to gain the trust and influence of the population.57  In Zabul, elders and 
local residence from the Tokhi clan, for example, will view a district governor from 
the Nasir clan with suspicion, even though they are both from clans of the Ghilzai 
tribe. 
Because of its location, its demographics, and its ever-present state of 
contestation between GIRoA and the Taliban, Zabul province provides an ideal 
venue to measure the state’s ability to broadly disseminate its political message 
through the use of mass communications to extend its influence and control over 
the population.  In this context, we use the radio broadcasts and population 
engagements by counterinsurgent forces to examine the state's success in 
extending control and influence over the local population. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
To investigate the relationship between insurgent violence and positive 
communications, we divided Zabul into grid squares of various resolutions.  After 
                                            
56 Ellen Haring, "Mobilizing Identity in the Pashtun Tribal Belt," Small Wars Journal (March 
17, 2010), 5, accessed November 12, 2013, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-
temp/393-haring.pdf. 
57 Sieber, “Field Notes: Zabul Province.” 
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experimenting with various grid squares, we discovered that 4000-meter grid 
squares provide the best insight for our data analysis.  Maintaining a 4000-meter 
grid resolution enabled us to observe the effect of all aspects of positive 
communications without blurring the range of our control variables.  The unit of 
analysis for our dependent variable is the grid-week, which counted the number 
of violent events that occurred in each grid square during the course of a week.  
We accounted for all positive communications variables (radio messages, 
welfare engagements and shura engagements) by the total count of events that 
occurred per grid-week.  We consider the effects of welfare engagements and 
shura engagement on insurgent violence at radii of 5000-meters and 15,000-
meters respectively.   
Because our dependent variable is a “count” variable, which takes only 
positive integer values, and because the distribution of this variable is likely to be 
over-dispersed, we utilize a quasi-Poisson regression model, which incorporates 
a separately estimated dispersion parameter.  Using this specialization, with our 
full set of control variables (described below), we examine the effects of welfare 
engagements, shura engagements, and radio messages on levels of violence 
across time and across space. 
C. DESCRIBING THE VARIABLES 
To provide evidence for our hypotheses, we first need to know the 
baseline level of insurgent violence before positive communications are 
introduced, if we are to isolate the positive communication’s independent casual 
effect. Additionally, without significant control variables, it is difficult to assess 
whether the observed increase or decrease in insurgent violence has been 
actually generated by the introduction of positive communications. To support our 
empirical investigation, we have collected data from several sources to analyze 
the relationship between positive communications and insurgent violence in 
Zabul.  Additionally, we consider several control variables that may affect the 
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amount of violence that occurs in a particular area and time.  In this section, we 
will explore each of these variables.  
1. Dependent Variable 
Insurgent violence is the dependent variable in this model.  We consider 
insurgent violence to be actions taken by insurgent or criminal elements to kill, 
injure, or destroy someone or something.58  Given that these coercive actions 
are used by individuals or groups to rebel against the state’s rule of law, we can 
interpret a relative decrease or lack of violence as evidence that the 
counterinsurgent’s positive communication has been effective. In our model, 
insurgent violence records a count of the number of events that occurred in a 
particular grid square during the course of a week. This variable consists of 
selected categories of significant activities (SIGACTS) identified in the 
international distributed unified reporting environment (INDURE) database for 
Zabul province from 2009 through 2011. This study limits the insurgent violence 
variable to four sub-categories: criminal events, enemy action, explosive 
hazards, and threats.  We define each of these variables in Table 2. 
 
SIGACTS category Definition 
Criminal Event Reported activities that break the laws of GIRoA. 
Enemy Action Reported activities initiated by insurgent groups to kill, injure, or destroy. 
Explosive Hazard Reported incidents of confirmed or potential explosive devices (includes IEDs and unexploded ordnance.) 
Threats Confirmed incidents of violence toward the population or counterinsurgent actors in an area. 
 
Table 2.   SIGACTS categories59 
                                            
58 Oxford University Press, "Oxford Dictionaries," accessed August 11, 2013, 
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/violence.  
59 Data provided by international distributed unified reporting environment (INDURE) 
database. For access, go to https://www.pixtoday.net/login/login.htm. 
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2. Independent Variables 
Our key independent variable, positive communications, consists of two 
significant aspects: population engagements and radio messages.  To guard 
against false results because of reverse causation, we lagged each independent 
variable by one week.  
a. Population Engagements 
Population engagements are recorded instances of COIN 
representatives meeting with a segment of the population in a public forum, 
which we categorize as welfare engagements and shura engagements.  
Welfare engagements are events in which counterinsurgents distribute goods or 
basic human needs to the local population.  Shura engagements are deliberate 
meetings between senior COIN representatives and influential district, tribal, 
village, and religious leaders from a select location. Both types of engagements 
are aggregated by total count of events per grid-week. The U.S. Army 2nd 
Cavalry Regiment collected this data as one of the unclassified inputs into the 
LBI.60  These population engagements cover all COIN engagements conducted 
by the regiment from July through December 2010. 
b. Radio Messages 
The second aspect of positive communications that we explore in 
this model is radio messages.  For purposes of this research, radio messages 
consist of the following sub-categories: 1) live radio interviews conducted by 
GIRoA officials to inform local audiences of the government’s vision for the 
future; 2) military information support operations (MISO) designed to influence a 
segment of the population to act in a specified manner;  3) Afghan National 
Security Force communications to the public regarding what they can do to help 
security forces make them secure from insurgents; and 4) public service 
                                            
60 Sieber, “Field Notes: Zabul Province.” 
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announcements created by GIRoA, ISAF, or non-government organizations.  
Radio messages are aggregated by the total count of new messages per week. 
Contracted radio disc jockeys broadcasted these messages on a 
network of eleven local radio stations setup by ISAF throughout the province.  
These stations broadcasted using 50-watt or 300-watt radio transmitters 
purchased with CERP funds in a broadcast studio package commonly referred to 
as radio-in-a-box (RIAB).61  The disc jockeys replayed messages cyclically over 
the course of several weeks until newly created messages gradually replaced 
them.  Local disc jockeys at each radio station mixed these messages with 
popular music and live programming and held artistic license to create positive 
programming as desired.  The disc jockeys reported the recorded messages 
broadcasted by frequency and informed ISAF of live broadcasts and interviews 
they had conducted.  This study captures the introduction of new messages to 
the airwaves between July 16, 2010 and January 6, 2011.62 
Radio plays an important role in the information environment, as it 
remains the primary media medium in Zabul province and throughout most of 
southern Afghanistan.  GIRoA and ISAF sponsor a majority of the stations 
broadcasting in the area through the RIAB program.  Though several other 
stations broadcast in the province, these local radio stations served as GIRoA’s 
primary means of communicating to the public. 
3. Control Variables 
Other variables exist that may affect the relationship between 
counterinsurgent actions and the amount of violence that occurs in a particular 
area.  We consider several variables based on the demographics and physical 
characteristics of Zabul, such as RIAB coverage area, the total amount of CERP 
money spent in an area by the counterinsurgents, population size, wealth, 
elevation, roads, access to cities, district boundaries, settlement locations, tribal 




and clan affiliation, land coverage, and location of radio towers. We also included 
the planting and harvesting schedules for wheat and poppy along with lags of 
violence generated by both insurgents and counterinsurgents to account for 
temporal, spatio-temporal, and pre-existing differences in levels of contestation 
across the province. 
a. RIAB Coverage  
RIAB Coverage is the most important control variable in our 
regression analysis.  It measures mass communication transmission capacity 
over space, and thus captures variation in the state’s ability to employ 
mechanisms of communication to influence the preference and expectations of 
the population.  Areas where the state broadcasts through mass communication 
may be less likely to rebel against the state than areas where it does not.  To 
capture the broadcast coverage area of the RIAB radio network, we conducted a 
propagation study using the tower location, transmitter power, and tower height 
for each of the RIAB locations in Zabul province.63  There are 11 tower locations 
in the province with various broadcast power and antenna heights. 64  Because of 
terrain, several areas within each tower’s coverage area are unable to receive a 
transmission.  The approximate RIAB coverage for Zabul province is pictured in 
Figure 4.65 
                                            
63 The author conducted this propagation study using software purchased from 
CloudRF.com. 
64 Sieber, “Field Notes: Zabul Province.” 




Figure 4.  Zabul’s RIAB radio coverage area66 
b. Commanders’ Emergency Response Program 
CERP is a U.S.-funded tool that “…provide[s] commanders with a 
non-lethal weapon system for high payoff projects and services.  CERP provides 
a quick and effective method to institute an immediate positive impact on the 
Afghan people.”67  While Berman and colleagues found it to reduce insurgent 
violence, particularly when used in smaller projects, we use it as a control 
variable in our regression analysis to isolate the effects of the soft power 
elements of positive communications.  Available through the INDURE database, 
this data shows all CERP spending in Zabul province from 2009 through 2011.68   
 
                                            
66 Sieber, “Field Notes: Zabul Province.” 
67 U.S. Forces Afghanistan U.S. Forces, Money as a Weapon System: Commander's 
Emergency Response Program Standard Operation Procedures, Vol. 1-06 (Kabul: Department of 
Defense, 2009), 5, accessed November 22, 2013, http://publicintelligence.net/money-as-a-
weapon-system-afghanistan-maaws-a-sop-2012/.    
68 Data available upon requested.  
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For this study, we configure the CERP variable to focus on the effects of 
essential service projects, aggregating the total cost of these projects by a radius 
of 10000-meters.   
c. Population 
Urban areas are often associated with a higher level of violence 
than rural areas.  To examine this, we compiled data derived from Oakridge 
National Laboratory’s Landscan project to estimate the population across the 
province in 2011 and data derived from U.S. Agency for International 
Development’s measuring the impact of stabilization initiative village dataset to 
provide refinement on the location of urban areas across the province.69  The 
combination of both datasets provides resolution down to the village level and 
offers insight into precisely where people live.  Population is log-transformed to 
account for diminishing marginal effects in areas with a higher population 
distribution.  Figure 5 provides a snapshot of population density across Zabul 
province. 
                                            
69 Eddie A. Bright, Phil R. Coleman, Amy N. Rose, and Marie L. Urban, Landscan 2011 
Global Population (Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 01 July 2012), accessed 
September 31, 2013, http://web.ornl.gov/sci/landscan/; Human Response COD-FOD Registry—




Figure 5.  Where the people live in Zabul70 
d. Wealth 
Wealth measures the average gross domestic product per capita 
for each location within Zabul. Wealth considers previous research, which 
concludes that, “higher levels of poverty are likely to translate into higher levels of 
insurgent violence since [individuals] have more incentives to take up arms to 
acquire [resources] to ward off destitution and starvation.”71  This variable is log-
transformed to account for diminishing marginal effects.72 
e. Elevation 
A correlation may exist between mountainous terrain and increased 
level of violence because of a state’s difficult in establishing control at higher 
elevations. To examine this, we draw elevation data from the U.S. Geological 
                                            
70 Bright et al., Landscan 2011 Global Population. 
71 Lyall, "Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks?," 332. 
72 William Nordhaus, Geographically Based Economic Data: Afghanistan Calculation, ed. 
Qazi T. Azam (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 2005), accessed October 31, 2013, 
http://gecon.yale.edu/afghanistan. 
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Survey through the University of Maryland’s Global Land Cover Facility.73  The 
data set specifies elevations throughout the world in 90-meter intervals, a 
resolution suitable to distinguish the peaks and plains of Zabul province.  
Elevation is log-transformed and recorded in meters. Each grid square that we 
define in our model estimates the average elevation of all points within its 
borders. 
f. Roads 
Roads may be associated with a higher level of insurgent violence 
such as roadside bombs against counterinsurgents. While many dirt roads exist 
throughout the province, we limited the roads in this study to Zabul’s improved 
primary and secondary roads.74  This variable records the presence (1) or 
absence (0) of a primary or secondary road within a specified grid square. 
g. Access  
Access measures the amount of time it takes a person to travel to a 
city with a population of at least 50,000. Accessibility to cities is also associated 
with a higher level of insurgent violence because it provides a ready escape 
route from the counterinsurgents. The data from the European Commission’s 
Joint Research Centre considers environmental and political factors.75  The 
closest cities of this size to Zabul are Kandahar, Kabul, and Quetta, Pakistan.    
                                            
73 U.S. Geological Survey, Shuttle Radar Topography Mission, 3 Arc Seconds (College Park, 
MD: Global Land Cover Facility, University of Maryland, 2004), accessed August 31, 2013, 
http://glcf.umd.edu/data/srtm/. 
74 “Afghanistan Shapefiles, Roads—(Line)” (Islamabad, Pakistan: Afghanistan Information 
Management Services (AIMS), 2005), accessed August 1, 2013, 
http://www.aims.org.af/ssroots.aspx?seckeyt=295. 
75 Andrew Nelson, Estimated Travel Time to the Nearest City of 50,000 Or More People in 
Year 2000, Vol. 30 arc seconds (Ispra, Italy: Global Environment Monitoring Unit—Joint Research 




Districts represent Afghanistan’s most significant sub-national 
governance boundary, yet they receive little attention in most studies on 
Afghanistan.  We retrieved the district shapefiles for Zabul province from the 
Princeton University Woodrow Wilson School’s Empirical Studies of Conflict.76  
For this regression model, if the majority of a grid squares falls within the borders 
of a district, we label the grid square as belonging to that district. 
i. Settlement Locations 
Settlement locations account for areas within Zabul with a 
population of at least 1000, 3000, and 5000 respectively.  Settlement locations 
address the concern that isolated and small villages may be more likely to be 
controlled by insurgents.77  
j. Tribe and Clan Data 
Within Zabul province, sub-tribes of the Ghazi super tribe inhabit a 
majority of the area, while sub-tribes of the Durani super tribe dominate large 
portions of the southwest and southeast of the province.  Other areas of the 
province are occupied by members of the Mirgul khel of the Miani tribe north of 
Shahjoy, and Atwals, Kawaks, and Huazaks in the Deh Chopan and Khak-e 
Afghan districts.78  Relative hegemony exists within the province as to where the 
tribes have established themselves, but several mixed settlements do exist.  We 
gathered the tribal and clan data from Courage Services and augmented the 
                                            
76 “Afghanistan—Administrative Boundaries: 398 Districts,” Empirical Studies of Conflict 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Woodrow Wilson School, 2013), accessed October 31, 2013, 
http://esoc.princeton.edu/files/afghanistan-administrative-boundaries-398-districts. 
77 Center for International Earth Science Information Network—Columbia University, and 
Centro Internacionale de Agricultura Tropical, Gridded Population of the World, Version 3 
(GPWv3): Population Density Grid, Future Estimates (Palisades, NY: NASA Socioeconomic Data 
and Applications Center, 2005), accessed October 31, 2013, 
http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/data/set/gpw-v3-population-density-future-estimates 
78 Douglas Grindle, "Daechopan District: The Economy, Security and the People," Field 
Anthropology (November 2010):37–40. 
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gaps in the province with multiple open source reports.79  In each case, we 
differentiate tribal affiliations at the lowest level available.  The tribes and 
associated clans and khels of Zabul province are listed in Table 3. 
 
Super Tribe Clan 
Durani Khagiani 
Ghilzai Acha Khel, Hotak, Izab (Hezab), Kakar, Tokhi, Musa, Nasir 
Miani Mirgul Khel 
Unknown (presumed 
Ghilzai) Atwal, Kawak, Huazak 
Table 3.   The clans and tribes of Zabul80 
The approximate location that each clan occupies in Zabul is 
represented in Figure 6.  If the majority of a grid square falls within the borders of 
these clan polygons, we label the grid square as belonging to that clan.  
                                            
79 “Afghan Tribal Shapefiles,” (Arlington, VA: Courage Services, Inc., 06 December 2010). 
For access, see https://www.pixtoday.net/af/index.php/DataCard-Afghan_Tribal_Shapefiles_v_1; 
Douglas Grindle, "Daechopan District: The Economy, Security and the People," Field 
Anthropology, Qalat. Afghanistan (November 2010): 37-40; Shahid Afsar et al., "The Taliban: An 
Organizational Analysis," Military Review 88, no. 3 (May 2008), accessed November 19, 2013, 
https://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/Afghanistan/Crisis%20Documents/Social%20Well-
Being/CFC%20SCD%20Reports/Ethnic%20Minorities/MILREVIEW_Taliban_Organizational_Anal
ysis.pdf; Naval Postgraduate School Program of Culture and Conflict Studies, "Hajji Din 





Figure 6.  Tribal areas of Zabul81 
k. Planting and Harvesting Data 
This variable takes into account the weeks that a relationship 
between the times that locals tend to their fields and insurgent activity levels may 
exist.  We chose the planting and harvest schedules for wheat and poppy in 
Zabul.  The harvest data is available from the University of California Davis’ 
College of Agricultural and Environmental Sciences.82  
l. RIAB Tower Locations 
This variable takes into account the locations of RIAB broadcast 
towers.  We believe the location of the transmission towers offers potential 
                                            
81 For access, see https://www.pixtoday.net/af/index.php/DataCard-
Afghan_Tribal_Shapefiles_v_1. Data is also available upon request.  
82 Hussain Sharifi and Mark Bell, "Cropping Calendar: Dates of Planting and Harvest Major 




targets for insurgents to attack.  The very presence of these towers may actually 
increase insurgent violence in a specified area. 
m. Spatio-Temporal Lags of Violence 
By incorporating spatio-temporal lags of violence, we accounted for 
previous short-term and long-term historical patterns of violence conducted by 
both insurgents and counterinsurgents in each of our defined grid squares.  Our 
model considers friendly and enemy actions that occurred in the previous week 
and the previous month to account for short-term spatio-temporal lags of 
violence.  At the same time, we considered friendly and enemy actions that 
occurred in each grid square through all of 2009 and the first half of 2010 to 
account for long-term spatio-temporal lags of violence. 
4. Data Summary 
Figure 7 depicts a snapshot of our data in time.  Note that SIGACTS and 
CERP spending data cover all of 2009 through 2011.  Our independent variables 
of population engagements and radio messages cover a significantly shorter 
range of time, the latter half of 2010.  As previously mentioned, by gathering 
SIGACTS data from the beginning of 2009, we established historical patterns of 
insurgent violence across the province.  This enables us to account for previous 
levels of short-term and long-term insurgent violence in each of our defined grid 
squares, and it allows us to demonstrate the impact of positive communications 
across the province.  These short-term and long-term patterns of insurgent 
violence likely influenced where counterinsurgents on the ground conducted 
positive communications as a direct reaction to the levels of violence in an 
area.83  Controlling for this longer history of violence is therefore necessary to 
reliably demonstrate the independent pacifying effects of positive 
communications. 
                                            
83 For more details on short-term and long-term patterns of insurgent violence, see Luke N. 
Condra et al., "The Effect of Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq," Working paper 16152, 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, 2010. 
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84 The authors generated this snapshot using data from the INDURE database and field 
notes; International Distributed Unified Reporting Environment (INDURE) Database, Protected 
Internet Exchange (PIX), Vol. 1.3.4.2, Colorado Springs, CO: Intelligent Software Solutions, 2013. 
For access, go to https://www.pixtoday.net/login/login.htm. 
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IV. RESEARCH FINDINGS 
The evidence drawn from each of our regression models strongly supports 
our hypothesis that positive communications by counterinsurgent forces reduce 
insurgent violence.  Specifically, a strong correlation exists between the total 
number of new radio messages broadcasted per week and a reduction in 
insurgent violence throughout the province.  We also see a strong correlation 
between total welfare engagements conducted per week and a decrease in 
insurgent violence within a 5000-meter radius of the engagements.  Finally, our 
model indicates a positive relationship between shura engagements and violence 
levels outside of the RIAB coverage area and a neutral relationship between the 
two inside the RIAB coverage area.  In this chapter, we discuss each of these 
findings, potential alternative explanations, and a series of robustness checks 
used to validate our findings.  
A. RESULTS 
We report the results of our main regression models in Table 4.  Model 1 
depicts our baseline specification of insurgent violence with all control variables 
before we introduce each of our independent variables one at a time.  Models 2 
through 4 show the results of each independent variable (for example, radio 
messages, welfare engagements, and shura engagements) when introduced into 
the regression separately.  Model 5 shows the regression results when all three 
positive communication variables are included in a combined specification.   
1. Positive Communications Variable: Radio Messages 
According to our findings, counterinsurgent radio broadcasts substantially 
decrease insurgent violence.  When we introduce the radio message variable 
into the baseline model of insurgent violence (see model 2), the coefficient for 
radio messages is negative and statistically significant (p < 0.001).  As 
illustrated in Figure 8, predictions derived from the model plotted here are 
calculated by holding the values of all other variables constant at their means 
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show that insurgent violence is expected to decrease as total radio message 
output per week increases.  The prediction remains consistent even when the 
remaining two positive communication variables are added (see model 5).  This 
finding validates our theory that radio broadcasts provide an effective medium to 
transmit political messages or oral propaganda, regardless of the message’s 
content.  Although different cultures approach media in different ways, which may 
affect how messages are perceived, our results indicate that the overall 
sentiment of the population of this agrarian province is receptive to messages 
broadcasted by counterinsurgents.  As long as counterinsurgents continue to 
push their messages through radio broadcast over time, the amount of violence 
within the broadcast area will decrease. 
 
Figure 8.  The effect of radio messages on violence levels 
2. Positive Communications Variable: Welfare Engagements 
According to our findings, welfare engagements conducted by 
counterinsurgents also substantially decrease insurgent violence levels.  When 
we introduce the welfare engagements variable to the baseline model of 
insurgent violence (see model 3), the coefficient for welfare engagements is 
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negative and statistically significant (p < 0.001).  As illustrated in Figure 9, the 
prediction shows a decrease in insurgent violence within 5000-meters as the 
number of welfare engagements per week increases while holding the values of 
all other variables constant at their means.  As shown in model 5, the relationship 
remains consistent when we add the remaining two positive communication 
variables.  This finding shows that providing social and humanitarian services to 
the population decreases insurgent violence regardless of whether welfare 
engagements take place inside or outside of the RIAB coverage area. 
 
Figure 9.  The effect of welfare engagements on violence levels 
3. Positive Communication Variable: Shura Engagements 
Lastly, we find that shura engagements conducted by counterinsurgents 
cause an increase in violence when conducted outside of the RIAB broadcast 
area.  When we add the shura engagements variable to the baseline model of 
insurgent violence (see model 4), the coefficient for shura engagements is 
positive and statistically significant (p < 0.05).  This finding shows an increase in 
insurgent violence within 15,000-meters of the location where the shura 
engagement takes place.  This result also remains consistent when we add the 


























At first glance, this finding may seem to contradict our expectation that 
shura engagements would help to initiate a dialogue between community leaders 
and counterinsurgents, thereby reducing the amount of insurgent violence that 
the population would be willing to tolerate.  However, we interpret this observed 
increase in insurgent violence in the vicinity of shura engagements as the result 
of insurgent attempts to oppose the counterinsurgent message.  When 
counterinsurgents seek to control the message in a remote area through direct 
local engagements, insurgents resort to symbolic violence to advertise their local 
strength and inhibit fence sitters from siding with the state.85 
In contrast, our models show that when counterinsurgents conduct shura 
engagements within the RIAB broadcast area their violence-promoting effects 
are neutralized.  When we interact the shura engagements variable with the 
RIAB coverage area, the coefficient for the interaction term is negative, 
statistically significant (p < 0.05.), and has a similar magnitude to the positive 
coefficient for the shura engagements variable (see Model 4).  This indicates that 
shura engagements, depending on their context, can either increase insurgent 
violence, or have a neutral effect on insurgent violence.  As illustrated in Figure 
10, when shura engagements occur outside the RIAB coverage area, insurgent 
violence increases in their vicinity; however, when shura engagements take 
place inside the RIAB coverage area, violence within the vicinity remains 
constant over time. 
                                            
85 McCormick and Giordano, "Things Come Together," 307. 
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Figure 10.  The effect of shura engagements on violence levels  
This lack of shura-induced violence inside the RIAB coverage area 
provides strong evidence of the importance of mass communication 
infrastructure in contested areas.  Outside the radio coverage area, events tend 
to be spun to the advantage of the insurgents.  In contrast, in areas where the 
state maintains influence over the information environment, insurgents appear to 
be far less capable of using shura engagements to promote further violence.  
B. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS AND ADDITIONAL FINDINGS 
We considered a number of alternative explanations in our model to 
confirm that the correlation between our key variables did not occur by chance.  
Specifically, we incorporated several control variables that may affect the amount 
of violence that occurs in each observed grid-week.  The inclusion of these 
control variables within our model did not affect the significance of any of our key 
independent variables.   
Access favors counterinsurgents with a negative coefficient (p < 0.001).  
Though we initially suspected this variable to favor insurgent freedom of 
movement, it seems that the government can more easily control areas that they 
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The coefficients for both population and roads show statistically 
significant positive relationships (p < 0.001).  These variables provide further 
evidence that higher levels of insurgent violence occurs near populated areas 
and on primary and secondary roads.  Population as an indicator of violence is a 
common finding in social science research, while increased violence near roads 
likely signifies that insurgents are targeting counterinsurgents with roadside 
bombs and other deliberate attacks.  While we expected roads to have a 
negative relationship with violence levels for the same reasons as accessibility, in 
actuality, they seem to increase violence as the road itself becomes a target.   
RIAB tower locations also display the same positive effect on violence 
levels because they, like roads, become targets.  While the broadcasts 
themselves have a pacifying effect on the population, insurgents consequently 
view the physical towers as a threat and target them to deny this effect to the 
government.  As a result, there may be an increase in violence at the precise 
locations of this infrastructure; however, as discussed previously, a statistically 
significant negative effect on levels of violence is observed throughout the rest of 
the province. 
While we expected insurgent violence to decrease during the harvesting 
and planting seasons because of job availability, we observed the opposite case 
in Zabul province, specifically with regard to wheat.  For this variable, we found a 
robustly positive coefficient (p < 0.001) that may indicate that agriculturally active 
seasons are prone to violence.  This could also prove coincidental as the wheat 
harvest season occurs between mid-May and mid-July, the height of the 
traditional fighting season in Afghanistan.  Further research is needed to more 
thoroughly explore this variable.   
Additional findings indicate that wealth has a statistically significant 
positive effect (p < 0.05) at a grid resolution of 4000-meters, but is insignificant at 
all other resolutions.  Elevation had a statistically significant negative effect at 
the largest and smallest resolutions (2500 and 5000 meters), but did not prove 
statistically significant in the middle resolutions.   
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Lastly, the baseline regression model of insurgent violence (model 1) 
consistently identified specific settlements, districts, and clans as having strong 
correlations with violence.  Specifically, in Zabul province, we determined that 
areas dominated by the Nasir and Khagiani clans have reduced levels of 
violence, while areas dominated by the Kakar clan have increased levels of 
violence.  
C. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
To ensure that the results of our model can withstand additional scrutiny, 
we ran our model using a variety of different grid square resolutions.  Although 
the 4000-meter grid square allows us to capture micro-level effects of positive 
communications on insurgent violence, we conducted robustness checks using 
2500, 3000, and 5000-meter grid squares, respectively.  As illustrated in Table 5, 
the results are consistent with our model's original findings.  It is interesting to 
note that CERP actually appears to increase insurgent violence when considered 
within a 10000-meter radius, but ceases to be statistically significant when we 
run the model with 3000-meter grid square resolution.  Similarly, wealth ceases 
to be statistically significant at both the 3000 and 5000-meter grid square 
resolutions.  Regardless of the resolution used, the coefficients for each of our 
key independent variables remain consistent and statistically significant.  The fact 
that our results hold regardless of geographic resolution demonstrates both the 
statistical robustness of our main findings and the enormous potential for the use 
of our approach as a tool by a variety of counterinsurgent organizations at both 
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Note: Settlement, district, and tribal fixed, including spatial-temporal lag of violence 
and cubic temporal trend, were included but not shown. Robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis. 
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01, ****p < 0.001 
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Note: Settlement, district, and tribal fixed, including spatial-temporal lag of violence 
and cubic temporal trend, were included but not shown. Robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis. 
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01, ****p < 0.001 
Table 5.   Quasi-Poisson regression: Insurgent violence (robustness) 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study was initiated to explore the effectiveness of positive 
communications in reducing violence during a counterinsurgency.  In doing so, 
we also offer an approach that counterinsurgents can use to gain a thorough 
understanding of their operating environment and assess their progress over 
time.  When used properly, this tool is the manifestation of Sun Tzu's view on 
assessments, “He who has a thorough knowledge of his own conditions as well 
as the conditions of the enemy is sure to win all battles.”86  This approach affords 
commanders, planners, and analysts the ability to see both himself and the 
enemy. 
Computing power and processes have developed significantly over the 
last several decades.  Counterinsurgents can and should take advantage of 
these technological advancements to more effectively combat insurgents.  The 
ability to collect and analyze vast amounts of information within an organization’s 
battle space enables them to make more informed decisions in executing COIN 
strategy, while also allowing them to more effectively measure progress over 
time.  The use of spatial regression to measure effectiveness can be executed at 
the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.  It can provide battle space owners 
and the standing government a better method to understand the operational 
environment and apply resources more effectively.  This final chapter will 
synthesize our empirical findings, explore the implications of our model, and 
discuss further research opportunities to improve upon the limitations of our 
results. 
A. SYNTHESIS OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
The nature of today’s counterinsurgency wars leads analysts to gather a 
variety of data to increase situational awareness and understanding of the 
                                            
86 Lo Shun-Te, Sun Tzu on the Art of War (Taipei, China: Li Ming Wen Hua Shia Yeh Kung 
Ssu, 1991), 71–72.    
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operating environment.  The tools used by the U.S. military, such as the 
Combined Information Data Network Exchange and the Distributed Common 
Ground System-Army, to track both friendly and enemy activities demonstrate 
that the infrastructure to collect data exists and is currently in use by 
counterinsurgents.  We believe, however, that more can be done with this data to 
assist counterinsurgents in achieving their objectives.  By examining the 
correlation of several variables that are already measured on a regular basis, we 
demonstrate strong correlations between some COIN actions and violence levels 
in Zabul.  More thorough employment of these techniques could drastically 
improve the analytical capability of today’s warfighters.  
Our findings indicate that positive communications do in fact reduce 
insurgent violence.  Specifically, radio broadcasts initiated by counterinsurgents 
appear to have decreased insurgent violence throughout the province.  
Additionally, welfare engagements conducted by counterinsurgents generated 
substantial decreases in local levels of insurgent violence.  This finding shows 
that providing social and humanitarian services to the population can decrease 
insurgent violence regardless of whether such actions take place inside or 
outside of the state's mass communication infrastructure.  Finally, our study 
illustrates that shura engagements conducted by counterinsurgents likely cause 
an increase in violence when conducted outside of the RIAB broadcast area, but 
have no such effect inside the broadcast area where the state maintains 
influence over the political messages disseminated in the wake of a local 
engagement.  Our evidence thus makes clear that positive communications by 
counterinsurgents is a critical component of COIN strategy. 
B. IMPLICATIONS AND APPLICATION 
Furthermore, our analysis shows that spatial regressions, based on readily 
available data, can significantly increase the efficiency with which 
counterinsurgents make inferences about the battle-space.  A broader 
incorporation of our methodology could greatly enhance the ability of 
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counterinsurgents in the field to quickly identify which types of activities they 
should conduct and which they should avoid in their particular operating 
environment, and thus ultimately facilitate their victory. 
The adoption of this approach could prove beneficial to counterinsurgents 
in a number of ways.  From a practical perspective, this methodology can be 
applied to any organization, government or military, looking to measure the 
effectiveness of its actions or to gain an understanding of its operating 
environment.  The model can be customized to meet the needs of platoon sized 
elements responsible for a battle space of only a few villages or made suitable to 
accommodate a corps sized element measuring the effectiveness of 
counterinsurgent actions for an entire country or region.  To make this model 
adaptable for a smaller organization, we recommend measuring regression 
statistics at high resolution grid squares (i.e., 1000-meters).  Larger organizations 
operating at the operational level will likely benefit more by using lower 
resolutions (3000 to 5000-meters.)  The model can be scaled to meet the needs 
of all sizes and compositions of counterinsurgent organizations. 
In addition to serving as an assessment tool, this methodology will prove 
beneficial in assisting planners with mission analysis.  Whether a unit is taking 
initial control of battle space or conducting a relief in place of a different unit, 
spatial regression models can make use of existing data to identify things not 
readily apparent during traditional mission analysis. For example, the 
incorporation of our approach could assist planners in identifying specific clans to 
partner with to benefit the incumbent government. 
Our research thus suggests that a better way to conduct COIN 
assessments exists.  The use of this methodology can assist planners in seeing 
the enemy, seeing themselves, and seeing their operational environment by 
allowing them to track their progress in direct relation to effects observed on the 
battlefield. 
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C. LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The usefulness of this approach to assess the effectiveness of COIN goes 
well beyond measuring the effectiveness of positive communications.  To 
generate accurate reflections of an organization’s effectiveness and therefore 
provide critical information to decision-makers in a timely manner, it would prove 
beneficial to more thoroughly examine additional relationships between several 
of the variables that we included in our model.  Further study needs to be 
conducted to explore other elements of hard power and their relationship to 
violence levels.  Specifically, additional research can strive to answer the 
following questions: 
• What is the effect of coercive counterinsurgent raids on local 
violence levels? 
• Do coercive counterinsurgent actions alter the impacts of positive 
communications?  
• What is the minimum amount of CERP spending, or number of 
CERP projects, at which an effect on violence will be observed?  
• Which types of radio messages broadcasted by counterinsurgents 
are most effective in reducing violence? 
• Which types of welfare engagements are most effective at reducing 
violence? 
• Which types of violence are decreased by positive communications, 
and which types are unaffected? 
For a variety of reasons, our study did not address these questions.  We 
were unable to find accurate, unclassified data on raids conducted by 
counterinsurgent forces.  Incorporation of this variable would enable future 
researchers to further explore the balance of hard power and soft power in a 
COIN situation.  Because of time constraints, we did not fully explore CERP as 
an independent variable in terms of both money spent and the number of 
projects completed, or explore differences in the types of violent activity that are 
affected by positive communications.  It would also prove beneficial to COIN 
operatives to determine which types of welfare engagements have a greater 
impact on violence levels.  For example, the MISO and civil affairs communities 
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could plan engagements more effectively if they knew that engagements that 
distribute school supplies in an area have more of an impact on violence levels 
than engagements that distribute food goods.  The answer to these questions is 
likely dependent on the current and past situations in each geographic region 
assessed, but could significantly increase the efficiency of COIN forces. 
Approaching the model from a broader scope could also prove beneficial 
for counterinsurgents.  From a holistic perspective, it is worth exploring several 
combinations of interaction variables to determine the optimal balance between 
hard and soft power that counterinsurgents should use.  Identifying the proper 
ratio of the application of elements of both hard power and soft power in each 
region could facilitate the development of more comprehensive and effective 
campaign strategies for counterinsurgents.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Analysts have tried for generations to determine the proper things to 
measure to assess the effectiveness of counterinsurgents.  Some, such as 
MACV in Vietnam, have tried to measure everything.87  Others, such as ISAF, 
have based measures of effectiveness on qualitative assessments at the district 
and provincial levels.88  Our study demonstrates a technique to conduct accurate 
quantitative assessments more efficiently and more effectively.  By examining 
selected aspects of positive communications in Zabul, Afghanistan, both across 
space and across time, we clearly identify strong evidence of their role in 
reducing violence. 
Moreover, the findings reported here are just the beginnings of this 
method’s potential, as this approach can be easily adapted to each unique 
operating environment.  By taking input from organizations actively conducting 
counterinsurgent operations and identifying metrics that are important within a  
 
                                            
87 Daddis, No Sure Victory, 330.   
88 Connable, Embracing the Fog of War, 158.  
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particular socio-political context, any force could use the methods described here 
to produce more accurate inferences about the conditions under which success 
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